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 Damn Vulnerable Linux (DVL) is a Linux-based (modified Damn Small Linux) tool for IT-Security & IT-Anti- Security and Attack & Defense. [ CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFOS! ]
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Home Articles - Black Hat Methods Conference Proceedings Subverting Windows 2003 Service Pack 1 Kernel Integrity Protection
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Subverting Windows 2003 Service Pack 1 Kernel Integrity Protection |
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Written by Alex Ionescu
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Windows 2003 Service Pack 1 introduces new features into the kernel
which protect against previous methods of accessing kernel memory from
user mode without the usage of a driver.
For example, both the usage of
the DevicePhysicalMemory section as well as of the ZwSystemDebugControl
APIs has now been completely blocked, meaning that editing kernel
memory through physical addresses, installing a callgate or using IDT
modifications are not possible methods of violating the ring privilege
level.
Unfortunately, it is the authors' belief that many legitimate
applications need access to physical memory from user-mode, without the
intent of accessing kernel mode memory. Such applications, for example,
might need to map the BIOS/Video ROM, or access ACPI tables.
This presentation will detail a method of bypassing one of these new
security measures, to give physical access back to user mode
applications as well as re-enabling ZwSystemDebugControl, by relying on
a previously undiscovered flaw in Windows, accessible only to
administrators. A simple solution to this flaw will also be given. As
well, this presentation will shed light into the new Win32 APIs exposed
in Windows 2003 Service Pack 1 and above, EnumSystemFirmwareTables and
GetSystemFirmwareTable, in order to provide hardware manufacturers with
a possible way to restore lost functionality of user-mode diagnostic or
other programs which accessed device-specific physical memory.
Obtaining a SYSTEM primary token, VDM initialization and a new method
of transferring from Ring 3 to Ring 0 without the usage of a driver are
the main topics which will be discussed.
Download: http://www.secure-software-engineering.com/downloads/recon2006/recon2006_Ionescu_Subverting_Win.pdf
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